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Subsolutions and the Essential Standard of Cooperative Garnet
r
Alvin B. Roth
Thii paper tntroducea a generalization of the von Neumann-
Morgenstern aolution, called a subsolution which can be shown
to exist for all games, (always in a non-trivial way for games
with non-empty core), and which preserves the interpretation as
"standard of behavior". A unique, distinguished subsolution,
called, the essential standard is also identified, and is shown
to reflect any symmetries present in the game.

1. Solutlona
When von Neumann end Morgenetern first defined the solution of
• cooperative game, they did so in the context of characteristic
function games with side payments. They defined a solution to be a
set S of imputations, such thst
(s) "No y contained in S la dominated by an x contained In 8"
(b) "Every y not contained In S Is dominated by some x contained
in S"
Condition (a) Is cslled Internal consistency , while condition (b) is
called external consistency
.
The sbbve definition does not involve any of the special structure
associated with characteristic function games with side payments, and
has subsequently been used In precisely the same form to define solutions
for more general kinds of games. For our purposes in this paper, we will
require very little structure of sny sort, snd will direct our attention
to abstract games, which we define to be pairs (X,>), where X is an
arbitrary set cslled the outcomes of the game , and > is an arbitrary binary
relation defined on X and called domination .
When we discuss- symmetry, we will find it convenient to consider an
abstract game to be a triple (N,X^), where N - {l, ...» n} ia a set called
the players of the game. In this esse, we will consider the set X to be
made up of elements x - (x^, x 2 , . . -xn ) Indexed by the elements of the
plsyer set N.
We have deliberately avoided imposing on the elements of an abstract
game any of the atructure which naturally follows from assumptions on the
rules of the game, such as the characterlatic function. The theorems which
we will prove in this paper do not depend in any easential way on auch
assumptions
.
We will find it convenient to define the dominion of a point xcX to be
the set D(x) E {yex|x>y}. That is, the dominion of an outcome x ia defined
to be all those outcomes which are dominated by it. In the same way, we
define the dominion of a set of outcomes SOC to be D(S) U- D(x) ; the set
of outcomes dominated by some point in S. Finally, we denote the complement
of D(S), the set of outcomes undominated by any outcome in the set S,
by U(S) X-D(S), and denote the composition of U with itself by U2 (S) »U(U(8)).
We are now in a position to rewrite the conditions of internal and external
consistency in terms of the function U, snd define s solution to be s set
See Aumann [1967]

SJX such that:
a
1
) ScU(S); and
b
1
) S»U(S)
Conditions (a ) and (b ) are precisely the same aa conditions (a) and (b),
and they make it apparent that an equivalent definition of a aolutlon la a
set S such that:
(c) S-U(S)
In a similarly compact way, we can write the core of an abstract game,
which is defined to be the set of outcomes undominated by any other outcome,
as the aet C - U(X).
von Neumann and Morgenatern interpreted a solution as a 'standard of
behavior', which once generally accepted by the players of the game, would
become self enforcing. They justified this by arguing that outcomes out-
aide of the solution- would be considered 'unsound* and thus be 'overruled',
by virtue of the fact that such outcomes are dominated by outcomes in the
solution. By the same token, no outcome in the solution overrules any
other outcome in the solution, and so no contradictions arise. Thus, once
a solution comes to be looked on as 'sound', It creates expectations which
reinforce this notion.
In proposing that cooperative games resolve themselves along the lines
auggested by such standards of behavior, von Neumann and Morgans tern con-
jectured that at least one solution exists for every game (in characteristic
function form with side payments). Should this not prove to be the case,
they vent on to say, a fundamental revision of the theory would be required.
For the nc.:t twenty-five years, this conjecture haunted game theory,
until It was finally resolved in thp negative by Lucas, in 1968. In that
year, he produced a ten-person game in characteristic function form with
side payrr .r.t3 (see ex. # 5.3) which has a large
,
non-empty core, but for
which no Bet S exists which satisfies the definition of a aolutlon: i.e.,
for which no sol tcion exists. It is therefore appropriate to consider a
generalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, which preserves the
interpretation as a standard of behavior, and for which exiatence can be
proved.
2 . Subsolutlons
We define a Bubsolution of the ab8tract game (X,>) to be a aet 9oX auch
1) SCU(S)
2) S - U
2
(S) « U(U(S))

We will sometimes find it convenient to resolve condition (2) into tha two
conditions
2a) SCU
2
(S);
2b) S^U 2 (S)
Conditions (2a) and (2b), taken together, are obviously equivalent to
condition (2).
Condition (1) needs little explanation; it says simply that the set S is
internally consistent--no element of S dominates any other element of S.
In order to understand the second condition, consider an arbitrary set
AcX, and the eet U 2 (A) - U(U(A)). No point x in U2 (A) is dominated by any
point in the set U(A) . Therefore, if x is dominated by some point y, then
y is not contained in U(A), but lies instead in its complement, 0(A) . This
means that y is dominated by the set A: i.e., there is a point in A which
dominates y.
2
We may therefore regard the set U (A) as the set of points "protected"
by A, in the sense that any point which dominates some point in U 2 (A) is in
turn dominated by some point in A. We say a set ACX is "self-protecting" if
ACU 2 (A). Thus, if x«A«U 2 (A), and if y dominates x, then there exists a
zcA such that z dominates y.
We are now in a position to interpret a subsolution S as a standard of
behavior, using the kind of reasoning originally proposed by von Neumann snd
Morgenstern to interpret solutions. In order to do this, we must show that
once a subsolution S becomes 'generally accepted' by the players of a game,
it creates expectations which reinforce the notion that only the outcomes in
S can be considered 'sound'. We must also show that if a set T^X which is not
a subsolution were to become 'generally accepted', it would create expectar*^
which would :ontradic - the notion t. it only outcomes in T should be considered
'sound', and thus such I set T would not have the stability properties necessary
to be considered a standard of behavior.
Suppo3e tien, that a subsolution S becomes generally accepted. Any point
in the set D(S) ie 'overruled' by some point in S, and hence unacceptable.
2Since, oy condition (2a), SoU (S), the set S is self-protecting, the set
of points thus overruled includes any point which dominates some point in S.
In particular, no point which is not immediately overruled by S-that is, no
point in U(S)-can ^xert a destabilizing influence on S by means of domination.
2
Nov condition (2b), SoU (S) , says that no point outside of S is protected
by S . In particular, no point in the set U(S)-S is protected by S. This means
that if x is a point in U(S)-S, then it is dominated by some pbint y in U(S)
.
But since x is undominated by any point in S, it must be that y is in
U(S)-S. Thus every point in the set U(S)-S is dominated by some other point in th«
same set, and the entire set thus 'overrules' itself leaving only the set S
as 'sound '
.

2
Looking at condition (2) as a whole, we eee that the set S - U (8) m 0(178))
la stable with respect to those points it fails to dominate --the aet U(Sj--in
preciaely the same way that the core, C - U*(X) is atable with reapact to tha
entire aet f outcomes X.
To see the role played by >i*ch condition in the definition of a subsolutior .
suppoee that a set T£IC which is not a subsolution is proposed as a atandard of
behavior. If T is not internally consistent, then some subset of T ia overruled
by T itself, and so T cannot be considered stable.
If T ia internally consistent, but not self-protecting, then there ia a
point x outside of T which is not dominated by T and hence not overruled,
which dominates some point t in T. The point x thus exerts a destabilizing
affect on the set T and thus the proposition that T ia atable ia not sel
enforcing.
Finally, consider the> esse where T ia internally consistent and self-
protecting, but in which T protects points which are not in T. In this case,
T5U(T) and T^U 2 (T), out T£u 2 (T) • If T is accepted, the pointa in 0(T) are
overruled. Consider now the set T* U2 (T)-T. Any point which dominates a
point in T* must in turn be dominated by T, 8ince T* is protected by T. But
the entire set D(T) is overruled by T, and hence potntc in T* are only dominf-ceci
by points which are unaound. If we are to remove these points from con-
sideration, by virtue of our acceptance of T, then we must also accept points
in T*, aince T* is undominated by any aound point. And if we accept T*, then
•urely we muat consider unsound the set D(T^) of points dominated by T*, and
so forth.
Thus, the acceptance of a set T having properties (1) and (2a) but not
(2b) implies the acceptance of some larger pet, and so the set T cannot be a
stable atandard of behavior. We will show, however, thst such a set T is
contained in some larger set S which is a subsolution.
It is clesr that the definition of a subsolution generslizes the von Ncuaann*
Morgenstern solution, since if a set S is a solution, then S - U(S), and hence
S - U 2 (S) and S is a subsolution. If e set S i3 a subsolution but not a
aolution, then it does not dorairv »ry point outaidc of S , but it Hoes
dominate all points? which doalo ~ome point in S. Every subsoliKion S
contains the core, since points outside of S are dominated either by S or
by U(S)-S. Every solution i8 a maximal subsolution, since a solution is a
maximal interrall istent set.
Since the clasb o c sub?olutions is larger than the class of solutions,
it is reasonable that ^absolutions exist even in ?amee for which no solution
exists. In fact, we can state the following theorem, which wss originally
presented as s corollary to the main theorem in Roth C 1974]
.
Stablll.-- Ticorcm : For every abstract game (X,>0, there exists a set
S£x such that SfiJ(S) and S - U 2 (S) .

A slightly stronger theorem cm actually be stated, which says that for
every abstract game a maximal subsolution exists.
A warni.g is in order here. Fo games in which ti.e core is empty, the
empty set satisfies the definition of a subsolution, jince U(0) " X, and
U 2 (0) - U(X) - C. Indeed, it is a simple matter to construct an abstract
game for which the empty set is the only subsolution. For games in
characteristic function form, however, we conjecture that a non-empty
aubsolution must always exist. This conjecture is weaker than the presentlj
unresolved question of whether a solution exists for every game in
characteristic function form with side payments having an empty core,
aince every solution is also a subsolution.
For gamea in which tl re is non-empty, no problems arise. Every
aubsolution is non-empty for such games, and so the stability theorem
assures the existence of a non-empty subsolution. Thus, not merely for
characteristic function games, but for every abstract game with non-empty
core, non-enpty subsolutions exist. In particular, for Lucas* famous
example of a game in characteristic function form with side payments for
which no solution exists, a non-empty subsolution can be found.
The proof of the stability theorem will be included in section 4
for completeness. The proof will be direct, as opposed to the original,
indirect proof of Roth [1974].
3. The Essential Standard
The study of \on Neumann -Morgens tern solutions was also hindered by
the fact that, in games for which solutions exist, they often occur in an
embarassing profusion. The problem then becomes not one of finding some
stable standard cf behavior, but of distinguishing among perhaps uncountably
many. The task is made more difficult by the Tact that among this plethora
of solutions, there may be none whic.i reflects the structure of the game in
a pleasing manner. In particular . as, (see ex. 5.4) produced a game with
infinitely many soiu-.ions, none of which reflect the symmetries of the
characteristic function.
In addition , it has not proven posaible to characterize the intersection
of all solutions, even in the case when this intersection is known to be non-
empty--!, l
.
, when the coro ia non-empty.
In the context o: 8, these difficulties can be at least
partially overcome. While uncountably many sub8oiutIons may exist for a gi
game (indeed, every solution is a subsolution), it is possible to identify a
unique subsolution, vhich we call the essential standard of the game, because
it is contained in every other aubsolution. We can state this in an equivalent
manner as:
Theorem 2 : The intersection of all subsolutions is itself a aubsolution, which
we call the essential standard.

It should a> that this la a theorem for
abstract games, and th* case where the core is empty, the empty set
is a subsolution, and h -ird Is the empty set. In tl
case where thr ial standard is non-ecpty
since it is a at ontains t e. The name 'essential
atandard' the fa .a contained in
every po
When v irlier <in
say that tw .y«X, x>>y implies
n^x"*-";}'- ;• Jtion whi I J f and leaves all o'
k«' nnged. CX iB symmetric if xeS implies T7jjX*S
for all symmetric playe iN.
As previously noted, games exist which have no symmetric solutions. In
the context of subaolut ions h
.
we can state the following:
Theorem 3: The essential standard is a symmetric set.
the next section we will formulate these theorems in terras of an
underlying algebraic structure which will permit us to offer proofs of
considerable generality.
4. Lattices and Semilattices
i
A Pfl rtia 11> ordered set is a set P on which a binary relation > is defined
such that (Vx, y, z, e P) ; (i) x > x; (ii) x > y and y > x 3> x - y; and
(iii) x > y and y > z«* x > z.
A chain is a partially ordered set Q such that every pair of elements
is comparable: <; Q) either x > y or y > x.
A meet semilat ? 3 partially ordered set L such that eve
points x, y « L have a greatest low^r bound in L, denoted xAy and called th
meet . A meet semilattice lS said to be complete if ev<:ry .ion -empty subset
ACL has a greatest lower hound AA in L called its meet.
^ Jol" s> „ Is o partially ordered set L such that every two po
x, y e L have a least . loted xVy and called their join .
A Join aer f every non-empty subset A£L has
a least upper b ts Join.
Not t y>x then x A y - x and xV y * y.
A 1st : a pa
i
-dered i both a raee
'
a Join
aemilatt ice . Ir irrplcte neot and a
complete Join I >llows that a complete lattice has both a least
element and a greatest »'lfment.
A subset K of a latt . d a compl 3eml lftt Ice if it
is a complete meet semi lattice and rhe meet of any non-empty subset S£K co

with the iw\t of thl same sec cc ib a subset of L. A complete jo ,
eubsfnllatt ic^ Is na logons 1
I
We shal 1 also use the following variant of Zorn's Lemma: "Every chain in
s partially ordered set: is contained in a maximal chain."
Denote e' -e L with small letters a, b, c, ... and denote
subsets of L with capital letters A, B, C,
The lar.tlce which we e interested in is the complete lattice L - TT t
whose elements are the subsets of X ordered by set inclusion. Thus, an
element a ?L is a subset of X, and for a, b, £ L, a [ b if and only if a
is contained in b. No confusion should arise from the fact that a is at the
same time an element of the lattice L and a subset of the set X.
/v
Similarly, a subset of the lattice A£L is a collection of subsets of X,
and the operations join and meet are ordinary set-theoretic union and ^ A
intersection. The function U takes the lattice L into itself; i.e., IJ: L —
It follows from the 'definition of U and from DeMorgan's l3ws (that the
complement of a union of 6ets equals the intersection of the complement of th-
sets) that the function U has property P : U (VA) -AU(A) E (U(a) iaeA} for
ACL. We are now in a position to state a theorem which will yield th«
Stability Theorem as a corollary.
Fixed Point Theorem : (1) If L is a complete lattice and U: L-*L has property P,
then there exists an element s c L such that 8 - U*(e) and s <U(s).
We will need the following lemmas for the proof:
Lemma U.l : (1) a < b# U(a) > U(b) ; (2) a < b* U
2 (a) < U
2 (b)
Proof : '1) a < bt^b « aV bc^U, )) - U(a)AU(b) < U(a). (2) Apply
part (1) j) and U(b).
Define L. ") s {„ e L|a < U 2 (a)}
Lemma A. 2 : (1)
^V"^ *
Proof : (1) a € L-OD* a < U(a)«*U(a)
*U 2 (a) »a « '(U 2 (a))
*U 2 (a) c L
r
Lenyva U
.
j : l
}
it I -lubseraiia tt ice of L.

» V* 1 ), I. required! " ( >' ™-
In a similar h hmeet subs,
. ice c
w
"
cnac LD(u) is a complete
o. t this
. , no Jr proof m
hat s • U 2 (8)
Let M be a maximal chain in R » n A i*.* - ..», ?
:e MeT.^r^ .^ , „.S? . l B ' and let s " VM. Then a c Lr.ni2
.h
L
°u
B
'
Ld< 3 i« non-em,
•how that there ex'ctF an £ e B. We
•how th.t
. .
B
,
»^.t d.i^t»u ttat . .'l^?""""- In °rd" "
Since K is a chain it follows thai- f«» -n
n < -. Noticing that m < „ implies mVnV, n ^' V u ^^ "- Q °r(by letnma 1) rj (n ) > „(„,-> m%™ » £^ |^C and that n < „ impliesHence, a
- }fH < AU?M) . VQ,M) I U(a). ».
n « M, m < U(n)
.
Therefore, s < U(s), which is to say, s S LD (U)
.
i« not maximal, contra?y to the ^sumption ' *
V ' ia)
'
then thc chain M
Examination of the proof reveals that *w~ i
it t maximal fixed point of the 1 J*! element 8 e L Produced ab
<U(t), then t > s. A L , n qI ? ind: l - e - if t e L and t. - ij2 (t)
exists an m c B~distinct ff™ tnf L
C °ndUi °n t0 in8u" • < inf L is thst there
We see that when « r the i al .M _- * ..
wirh^the fu:
the do •
° l8custed earlier, in conj.
t c L produced above is i . JLy
"urination relation, :hen the elerw
tet LD (U) discussed in the X,>).
•ubsets of X, while the .. [^ 8e *' '"J™ 1V™1-1"™protecting subsets of X
•*,*££££?„ core ,. nov t8 be an
lattice L. A euf: "e greeteet eiement of the
°f • asure the exlatenc,
••»-» -e«P'y. lnt.rn.lly con.i.t.nt,
Theorem 2 i The I --,,-- aU8 ' U Itulf
. .„b. l ut ,.
just ut l^)sl^ t ,c „ t of flxed poInts u2

2
By Tarski's BJ) , h} is a complete lattice
(but not a sublatt. L) so there la a meet A ned on Lp(U 2 ) «
that for all A£ \k.
Take S cj, and let E - A. J, S which Implies U(E) > 'J(S)
> S > ft, and ao E c i. r ) < ALp(U*) </lJ I i together Imply
K -/Q • The utlons is subsolution E.
Aa corollary of The proof, ve he
2
Corollary 4.a : The leaBt fixed point of the fui U is a subaolution.
Before proving that the essential standard is a symmetric set, we prove the
following related theorem.
Theorem 3A : There exists a symmetric subsolution of every abstract game.
We will' need the following definitions and lemmas.
Let P - (SCX|S is symmetric}.
2 2
Leama 4.4 ; U : P-*E; i.e., if T is a symmetric set, then so is U (T)
.
2 2
Proof : Suppose U (T) is not symmetric. Then there is an x e U (T) such t
nx t U
2 (T), where v permutes symmetric players. But nx i U*(T) implies the
existence of a z e U(T) such that z>ttx. Let z' - n"*z. Then z'> x and thus
z' e D(T) . This in turn implies the existence of a t e T such that t > z ' .
Consequently, ^t^n^' - ?.. But T is a symmetric set, and so vt c T. Therefore,
z c D(T) , contrary to assumption.
Lemma 4.5 : The core, C, is a symmetric set.
Proof : Let x e C and suppose nx i C. Then there exists a y such that y>rrx.
But n" 1 y> n"* nx x, which contradicts x e C.
Proof of Theorem : Consider e maximal chain M in P fi B, where
P « [S € Lis is -symmetric] and B - L^U) .D LD 'U 2 ) , as Lefore. M is
non-empty since C € P P. B. We will show that VM is a symmetric subsolutic
First we must show that VM e 't VM « P P B. It follows
from the proof c >rem 1 that VM e B. ?ee that VM e P, note that
(since the Join operation on L is ordinary ion) VM is the
union of a nest* lc sets. If VM is not symmetric, then
there exists an or aome symmetric permutation tt.
But x e V x is - symmetric set m € M. But m is
symmetric and ry to assumption.
So, VM B.
2
Noting tb naximalir
that VM - LT(VM) • O
Exerrimtion of the abov f reveals that the set S - VM is a maximal
symmetric subsolution difficult to modify the proof to show that
the least sub6c Tic.

10
Theorem 3: The minimal subsolution E is syrnn
ll°°l : I H p B, where L(B) - fs c
' "VM S' < ^quent
ia S' - i. a ay lc
flub8r aet su' .olution, arid so S' - I
In order to be l9 related t0
the core, we define a I le aupej ; ch Is contained in the
essential star and hei every subsolution), and which contains the
core. For, not J clonal conv te H - U2
. Define the supercore to
the sr
kg i H
k
f«J).
,0) . c> the core>
nmaj^6: If S is a sub* m, then £g.U Hk (0).
Proof: S 3 ^,: 2 ( S)a. S
^
saHk
- 1
(0) implies H(S).- Sr>Hk <0).So by induction,
! H
K (0)
.
"
k»l v '
The core and the supercore coincide if an f the core coincides
with the essential standard. The supercore is larger than the core only whthere exist points outside the core which are protected by the
For arbitrary abstract games it is not true in general that the supercore
coincide, with the essential standard. That is, it is possible to constr,
an abstract gazte in. which the essential standarc ctly contains the super-
core. Wither or not it is possible to find a game in characteristic functionform which exhibits this property is still an open question.
5
. Examples
We define a microcosm of the game to be a subset W£ X such that no element •
x outside of W dominates any element y in W; i.e., WSO(X-W). Any r. ,ty,internally consistent subset S£W with the property SSU(U(S) f) W) will have
\f\
Pr
Trr\
V
r
S§ U (Jh and WlU be contained in some subsolution. In particular.
ll< a < ' 5
i8
'
if S ls a
^
olution of the microcosm W, then S is <tained in some subsolur ri8tlo ha8 proved U8eful in anal x flome
examples, and may pr some theoretic- erett as well.
!|^El seller and 2 buyer cnsider the three olayer*™
,A ,3} and v(l) - v(2) -
This eame is arudi/d <ndetail bv Shapley
,x3 ) Ix >
0*
1
"
l
!
2
' 9 de P^ trie coordinates in Fiaure la Thecore is the po 8 * in
fm y;°/ i8 g««e is the set of monot ,rve. c (p) -
h hat I nuous iunct18 " ch c * P A typical sol
also shows t
x
in riRure iD
»
wh

For every < C < 1, the subset McCX defined by Mc - (x € Xlxj >
is s microcosm. rh« set of solutions of the microcosms sre in fact subaolut'
of the game
.
That is to say, each element of the family of monotone curves zc (p) "
(P. ^(P >) i g^P)) ^he i f and g are as before, is a subsolut)
A typical subsolution S is depicted in Figure 2a, while Figure 2b depf'
the set U(S). It is easy to see from the diagram that any x which dominates
a point on the curve S zc (p) is in turn dominated by a point z e S, and
any point x s U(S) - S is dominated by a point y « U(S) - S.
Note that the dominion of an arbitrary set is open, and thus a subsolution,
which is the complement of a dominion, is a closed set. Thus the curve
S' - z
c (p), c < p < 1, which is open at its lower end, is not a subsolution,
although it is both internally consistent and self-protecting. That is,
S' CL'(S') and S f CL' 2 (S'), but S* + U 2 (S').
Example 5.2 : Symmetric three person game. Consider the three percon game
in characteristic function form where N - [l, 2, 3], :(l) • v(2) « v(3) - C.
v(12) - v(13) - v(23) - v2 , v(123) - 1 where 2/3 < v2 < 1. This gama. which
has no core is studied in detail by von Neumann and Morgenstern [194A].
The set of imputations is X • {(x
1
,x2 ,
X3) |x^ > 0, i 1,2,3 Sx^ l}.
Figure 3 shows the set of imputations divided into seven regions, labeled W,
and N through S, and associated with the coalitions which are effective for
points in each region.
The region W is the simplex defined by the relations £. x • 1 a.
x^ + xj < v 9 , V 1, j e N. It is easy to see from the diagram that W is a
microcosm, since any coalition SffN which prefers a point x not in W to a
point y in W, is not effective for x; i.e.
,
Vx i W, y e W, x± > y if Xj > y*
implies x. + x > v .
Figure 4 1 shows two solutions o the microcosm W wiich are subsolutions
of the game. In Figure 4b tney are pictured with the region they ao not
dominate.
No point in ai.y o triangles dominates any point in another
shaded triangle, hepcj each triangle is exactly the :.amt: an the game
Exampls 1. k typical solution of the game, therefore, would look like
Figure 5a, while a typical subsolution might look like Figure 5b.
The available experimental evidence (see, ior instance, Riker r 197l])
seercs con* iftent with the proposition that games resolve themselves along
the lines sugges t subs* is.
Examplp 5.3: Game with no solution (Lucas Cl968el). Lucas constructs a
ten person game in which the set of imputations X can be partitioned into
regions .

12
X - {X - B} U (B - (C U E U F)} U C U E U F,
where C 1b the The domination relation is auch that
(1) DCO^x - B) U [B - (C U E U F)}; (2) E fl D(C U F) - 0;
(3) F n D(C U E U F) - 0; (4) D(K)DE.
This Ll tion la aufficlent to shov that the supercore, C U F,
is a aubaolutlon, since (1) fc U F}«TU(C UF)- (CUfUe); and
(2) D2 (C - U(C U F U B) -
Example 5-4 : cas 1968b] Game with no symmetric solutions. Lucas produc»
a game In which the set of Imputations X can be partitioned Into the regioi
X - H, H - [C U (F-E) U Ej, C, F-E, and E, where H contains the core C •
the region F, and F contains E. The domination relation is such t
(1) 0(C) C U F; (2) (F-L)cU(C U F) - U 2 (C); and (3) F£U(C U (F-E)). The
acta C, F-E, and E all preserve the symmetry of the game.
Relation (1) asaurea ua that every solution is contained in C U F.
Therefore, it follows from (2) and (3) that any solution K must be of the
form K • C U (F-E) U K 1
,
where K^E is a solution for E. Lucas is able to
ahow that there exist infinitely many solutions K 1 of E, but that none of
these exhibits the symmetry of the game. It follows that there exists no
symmetric solution for the game.
The feet that some solutions do exist, however, implies that (4) Efi.D(E).
Together with relatione (2) and (3), thia implies that the set C U (F-E) ll
a subsolution, since C U (F-E) - U 2 (C U (F-E)). Thus a symmetric ' •dbaoluCics
does exist.
6. Postscript
The theorems proved in this pape~ are of sufficient generality to have other
applications for game theory. Tr. particular, since abstract games were defir.ed
in terms of an y relation on the set o Ties, «e may interpret
theorems presented he is other than domination.
For instance Harsany < . oaea a rela; r>direct do
which ne usee to strengthen rnal consistene
sets. If we interpret the binary re] ; an abstract game as indirect
dominar Other than as the usual domination rslatio en we can reinterpret
the theorems in this paper in terms of set- vhich are stable w
respect to :t domination.
1 a aubsequent pap* asoning will be explored as it a -
to the bargaining ^et of Auraann and Maschler [1964].
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